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ABSTRACT 
 
Layer of Protection Analysis Applied to Ammonia Refrigeration Systems. 
 (December 2008) 
Gerald Zuniga Reyes, B.S., Universidad Nacional de Colombia 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sam Mannan 
 
 
 Ammonia refrigeration systems are widely used in industry. Demand of these 
systems is expected to increase due to the advantages of ammonia as refrigerant and 
because ammonia is considered a green refrigerant. Therefore, it is important to evaluate 
the risks in existing and future ammonia refrigeration systems to ensure their safety. 
LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) is one of the best ways to estimate the risk. 
It provides quantified risk results with less effort and time than other methods. LOPA 
analyses one cause-consequence scenario per time. It requires failure data and PFD 
(Probability of Failure on Demand) of the independent protection layers available to 
prevent the scenario. Complete application of LOPA requires the estimation of the 
severity of the consequences and the mitigated frequency of the initiating event for risk 
calculations.  
Especially in existing ammonia refrigeration systems, information to develop 
LOPA is sometimes scarce and uncertain. In these cases, the analysis relies on expert 
opinion to determine the values of the variables required for risk estimation. Fuzzy 
Logic has demonstrated to be useful in this situation allowing the construction of expert 
systems. 
Based on fuzzy logic, the LOPA method was adapted to represent the knowledge 
available in standards and good industry practices for ammonia refrigeration. Fuzzy 
inference systems were developed for severity and risk calculation. Severity fuzzy 
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inference system uses the number of life threatening injuries or deaths, number of 
injuries and type of medical attention required to calculate the severity risk index. 
Frequency of the mitigated scenario is calculated using generic data for the initiating 
event frequency and PFD of the independent protection layers. Finally, the risk fuzzy 
inference system uses the frequency and severity values obtained to determine the risk of 
the scenario.  
The methodology was applied to four scenarios. Risk indexes were calculated 
and compared with the traditional approach and risk decisions were made. 
In conclusion, the fuzzy logic LOPA method provides good approximations of 
the risk for ammonia refrigeration systems. The technique can be useful for risk 
assessment of existing ammonia refrigeration systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
 
Ammonia (NH3) has been used as a refrigerant since the nineteenth century. 
Today, food processing and cold storage industries are the main users of ammonia 
refrigeration systems. New applications using ammonia as refrigerant are under 
development and their use is expected to increase because of the thermodynamic and 
environmental characteristics of ammonia.  
The advantages of ammonia as refrigerant include: low molecular weight 
(17.03), low boiling point (-28 °F at 0 psig), and high latent heat of vaporization (1371.2 
kJ/kg at boiling point and 1.013 bar). Also, ammonia has environmental advantages 
because it is not considered a greenhouse gas and it has an Ozone Depletion Potential 
(ODP) of 0.00 when released to the atmosphere [1].  These characteristics make 
ammonia an efficient and environmentally friendly refrigerant. In contrast, fluorocarbon 
based refrigerants are under severe environmental regulations and the costs of 
installation and operation are higher than those for ammonia refrigeration systems [2]. 
However, ammonia is toxic, flammable, explosive and corrosive. Table 1.1 
presents a summary of the properties of ammonia. Several incidents have occurred in 
ammonia refrigeration facilities but well designed and maintained facilities have good 
safety records [3]. OSHA’s Process Safety Management program (PSM) and EPA’s 
Risk Management Program (RMP) are mandatory for large facilities using ammonia as 
refrigerant [2]. Nevertheless, risk assessment is required regardless the size of the 
ammonia refrigeration system. 
 
______________________ 
This thesis follows the style of Process Safety Progress. 
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Table 1.1 Summary of properties of ammonia [1] 
 
Boiling Point -28 F 
Weight per gallon of liquid at -28 F 5.69 pounds 
Weight per gallon of liquid at 60 F 5.15 pounds 
Specific gravity of the liquid (water=1) 0.619 
Specific gravity of the gas (air=1) 0.588 
Flammable limits in air 16-25% 
Ignition temperature 1204 F 
Vapor pressure at 0 F 16 psi 
Vapor pressure at 68 F 110 psi 
Vapor pressure at 100 F 198 psi 
One cubic foot of liquid at 60 F expands 
to 
850 cubic foot of gas 
Easily absorbed by water 
Corrodes copper, zinc and their 
alloys. 
Compatible with iron, steel 
Highly reactive with mercury Reactivity 
Incompatibility with 
polyisobutylenes, PVC and 
styrene copolymers 
Major exposure hazards Inhalation, skin contact, eyes 
contact, ingestion 
Occupational exposure limits OSHA PEL: 35 ppm 
 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a recent developed risk assessment 
methodology. LOPA quantifies the risk quickly and allows the use of multiple types of 
logic. When generic and historical data are available, Bayesian logic is used for updating 
the data [4]. Instead, Fuzzy logic applies for scarce or highly uncertain data to allow the 
risk calculations. Through the use of membership functions, fuzzy logic represents 
knowledge that can be quantitative and qualitative in nature. Expert systems can be built 
based on fuzzy logic and they provide reasonably accurate outcomes useful in systems 
analysis. 
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This research will develop the LOPA methodology using fuzzy logic to combine 
generic data and expert opinion to estimate the risk in ammonia refrigeration systems. 
The method will provide a tool for risk decision and safety improvement, especially, for 
existing facilities. 
 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In order to develop the LOPA risk assessment technique, it is required to review 
the ammonia refrigeration systems and its hazards. Also, the LOPA technique 
application and the Fuzzy Logic incorporated in LOPA. 
 
1.2.1. AMMONIA REFRIGERATION SYSTEMS 
 
Ammonia is widely used in mechanical refrigeration systems. These systems are 
divided into mechanical vapor compression and absorption refrigeration according to the 
driving force. Heat is the driving force for absorption systems and mechanical energy for 
mechanical vapor compression. This work focuses on mechanical vapor compression 
refrigeration systems.  
The vapor compression refrigeration cycle is presented in figure 1.1. The cycle is 
based on the latent heat of the working fluid and the increasing of the fluid boiling points 
with pressure. A typical process using ammonia as refrigerant is presented in figure 1.2. 
The refrigeration cycle takes place in four stages [6]. Ammonia at – 40 F and 0.7 bar is 
compressed to 12.5 bar with increasing in temperature. Next, ammonia condenses and 
leaves the condenser at 86 F. Liquid ammonia flows through the expansion valve, 
reducing its pressure to 0.7 bar. Simultaneously, temperature falls to – 40 F because 25% 
of the liquid evaporates. The liquid-gas mixture flows trough the evaporator absorbing 
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heat from the surroundings. All the liquid ammonia evaporates and returns to the 
compressor to start the cycle again. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Vapor compression refrigeration cycle [5] 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Simplified ammonia vapor compression system [6] 
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Industrial systems are more complicated looking for efficiency and flexibility. 
Several stages for compression and expansion are common. Also, the cycle is divided in 
sub-cycles and a central system provides refrigerant to different points of use. Appendix 
A includes the physical properties of ammonia. Appendix B presents the P&IDs for the 
typical industrial ammonia refrigeration system used in this research. 
 
1.2.2. HAZARDS IN AMMONIA REFRIGERATION SYSTEMS 
 
Hazards in ammonia refrigeration systems are associated with the chemical and 
physical characteristics of ammonia and the temperatures and pressures in the system. In 
general, hazards for ammonia refrigeration systems can be classified in [7]: 
• Hazards from the effect of low temperature: brittleness of materials at low 
temperatures, freezing of enclosed liquid, thermal stresses, changes of volume due to 
changes in temperature. 
• Hazards from excessive pressure caused by: increase in the pressure of condensation 
or pressure of saturated vapor, expansion of liquid refrigerant in a closed space 
without the presence of vapor and fire. 
• Hazards from direct effect of the liquid phase: excessive charge of the equipment, 
presence of liquid in the compressors, liquid hammer in piping and loss of 
lubrication due to emulsification of oil. 
• Hazards from escape of refrigerants: fire, explosion, toxicity, freezing of skin, and 
asphyxiation. 
• Hazards from the moving parts of machinery: injuries, hearing loss from excessive 
noise, damage due to vibration and ignition of material due to broken parts. 
• Hazards from operation: excessive temperature at discharge, liquid slugging, 
erroneous operation, reduction in mechanical strength caused by corrosion, erosion, 
thermal stress, liquid hammer or vibration. 
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• Hazards from corrosion. This category requires special consideration because the 
alternate frosting and defrosting of some parts of the system and the covering of 
equipment with insulation. 
 
In order to help with the communication of the ammonia hazards, there are 
several safety classifications for ammonia [1]. The National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA) classifies ammonia as rating 3 for health hazards due to the corrosive effects on 
the skin. Rating 1 for fire hazards because it considers that it is difficult to ignite, and 
rating 0 for reactivity hazards because does not react violently with other substances.  
Other classifications as ASHRAE, consider ammonia as “low flammability” 
because the heat of combustion is lower than 8174 Btu/lb and the LFL is above 14%. 
Also considers ammonia as “high toxicity” refrigerant because higher toxicity results 
from TLV are lower than 400 ppm. API, NIOSH, ACGIH and the National Research 
Council have their own classifications. 
Fire and explosion hazards of ammonia are presented in table 1.2. Ammonia is 
considered low flammability because in an outdoor situation, its flammability limits are 
difficult to reach [1]. However, in confined spaces hazardous situations are possible and 
can cause fires and explosions.  
Low peak pressures and slow rate of pressure rise are characteristic of ammonia 
explosions [1]. Table 1.3 presents the explosion pressures for ammonia compared with 
pentane. Ammonia explosions are less violent and damaging than hydrocarbon 
explosions [8]. 
 
Table 1.2 Fire and explosion hazards of ammonia [1] 
 
Fire and Explosion Hazards 
Flash Point N/A 
LFL 15 – 16% 
Flammability limits 
UFL 25 – 28% 
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Table 1.3 Explosion pressures of ammonia and methane [1] 
 
Explosion characteristic Ammonia Methane 
Peak Pressure ~ 60 psig ~ 105 psig 
Rate of Pressure Rise 440 psi/second 3000 psi/second 
 
Ammonia fires are extinguished with water fog or spray, except if a pool of 
liquid ammonia is present [1]. Fire extinguishing procedures include using water to 
mitigate vapors and vacate the area if concentration exceeds 5%. 
Health hazards data of ammonia are inhalation, ingestion, skin contact and eye 
contact. Ammonia has an irritating odor that alerts of dangerous exposure. Odor 
threshold concentrations range from 1 ppm to 50 ppm. Nevertheless, acclimation occurs 
with chronic exposition to low concentrations of ammonia.  
Effects of ammonia to health are severe because it is absorbed by the water in the 
tissues quickly. The IDLH is 500 ppm and a short exposure to 5,000 ppm can cause 
permanent injury or death [1]. Table 1.4 presents some ammonia concentrations and 
responses. 
Reactivity hazards are present if ammonia is in contact with strong acids, 
chlorine, bromine, mercury, silver and hypochlorites. Also, if temperature is higher of 
600 F ammonia decomposes generating hydrogen. 
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Table 1.4 Ammonia concentrations and responses [1] 
 
Concentration Response 
400 ppm Immediate throat irritation 
1,700 ppm Cough 
2,400 ppm Threat to life after 30 minutes 
>5,000 ppm 
High likelihood of mortality with short 
exposure 
 
Because all those hazards related to ammonia, several safety regulations were 
developed for ammonia refrigeration systems. They include the OSHA PSM 29 CFR 
Part 1910.119 and the EPA RPM 40 CFR Part 68. Common elements for both 
regulations are hazard review, mechanical integrity, emergency response and operator 
training. IIAR has guidelines for OSHA and EPA regulations [9] [10] and also 
guidelines for equipment design and installation [11], operation [12] safety and 
operation procedures [13], start-up inspection and maintenance [14], water 
contamination [15], minimum safety criteria [16], room ventilation [17], machinery 
room design [18], identification of ammonia refrigeration piping [19], and guidelines for 
avoiding component failure caused by abnormal pressure or shock [20]. 
 
1.2.3. LOPA 
 
LOPA is a semi-quantitative risk assessment methodology. It was developed to 
determine the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) [21]. 
The book “Layer of Protection Analysis, Simplified risk assessment” published by the 
Center of Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers [22], has made LOPA accessible to the public since 2001.  
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LOPA is based on the concept of protective layers. In order to prevent the 
occurrence of an undesired consequence, a protection barrier is implemented. If this 
barrier works well, no more protection layers are required. However, there is no perfect 
protection barrier and several are needed to reduce the risk to tolerable levels. LOPA is 
useful to reduce the risk of a process to a tolerable level through the analysis of 
independent protection layers (IPLs). 
IPLs satisfy the criteria of specificity, independence, dependability and 
auditability [22]. An IPL has to be independent of other protection layers available 
against an undesired consequence, and also has to be independent of the initiating cause. 
The criterion of specificity indicates that an IPL detects, prevents or mitigates the 
consequences of specific hazardous events. Additionally, an IPL reduces the risk by a 
known and specific amount and it is designed to allow auditing the protective function 
[23]. 
Applying LOPA is possible at any stage in the lifecycle of a project [22]. 
Typically LOPA is developed after a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), for example a 
Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) [22]. Figure 1.3 shows the main steps of 
LOPA and the relationship with HAZOP.  
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Figure 1.3 LOPA and HAZOP [24] 
 11 
 
 
In addition, LOPA is used for capital improvement planning, management of 
change, mechanical integrity programs, risk-based maintenance programs, operator 
training, emergency response planning, design of overpressure protection, evaluating 
facility sitting risks, accident investigations and evaluation for taking a safety system out 
of service [22].  
Modifications to the original LOPA methodology have the purpose of reducing 
the uncertainty associated with the initiating event frequency and probability of failure 
of the IPLs. For example, Bayesian Logic has been applied to LOPA and it can update 
the generic data with plant specific data [4].  
This work applies the Fuzzy LOPA model developed by Markowski and Mannan 
[25], enhanced with the methodology for developing scenarios for LOPA [26].  
 
1.2.4. FUZZY LOGIC 
 
Fuzzy Sets theory was developed by Lotfi Zadeh in the 60´s [27]. It was 
developed to deal with imprecise, ambiguous, or missing input information that are 
typical of many problems [28]. The idea behind fuzzy logic is to mimic how a person 
makes decisions.  
There are several successful applications of fuzzy logic. Fields of application 
includes process control, civil engineering, reliability engineering, and human reliability 
[29]. In process safety and risk assessment the fuzzy sets theory has been applied in fault 
tree analysis [30] [31], toxicity index [32], failure modes and effect analysis [33], safety 
and operability assessment of process plants [34] [35], hazardous materials 
transportation [36], inherently safety index [37], ranking of fire hazards of chemical 
substances and installations [38], safety critical systems [39], risk matrix [40] and LOPA 
[25]. 
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Uncertainties characterize classical LOPA. In general, a constant conservative 
value for the failure probability for each IPL is used. This value is provided by an expert 
and can be imprecise. Other sources of uncertainties in LOPA are the categorization of 
the severity of the consequences and the change of the severity after the IPL activation. 
As a result, estimates of risk tend to be very conservative or overestimated [25]. The 
classical approach uses rough estimates of the probabilities to solve the problem. On the 
contrary, LOPA is a typical case where fuzzy sets theory can be applied. 
The fuzzy sets theory is based on the idea of membership. They allow the 
definition of vague concepts into mathematical structure [41]. In traditional sets theory 
an element belongs to a given set or not. In contrast, an element can belong to a set in 
some degree in fuzzy sets theory. The degree is called membership (µ) and it takes 
values between 0 and 1. Among the different fuzzy sets, the most important are the sets 
with membership functions that can be represented as mathematical functions [38]. 
Typical representations include triangles and trapezoids. Called fuzzy numbers, the 
fuzzy sets are very useful describing linguistic variables and qualitative data. Figure 1.4 
presents the classical and fuzzy sets. 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Classical and fuzzy sets [28] 
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 Examples of fuzzy sets and membership functions in this work are presented in 
figure 1.5. Gaussian membership functions, triangular and trapezoidal are the most 
common. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Fuzzy sets and membership functions 
 
 Fuzzy modeling requires transformation of the input variables in three steps 
before obtaining output information [42]. Figure 1.6 shows the structure of a fuzzy logic 
system and the transformation steps. 
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Figure 1.6 Fuzzy logic system structure [40] 
 
Fuzzification transforms the input crisp value in one or more fuzzy sets. These 
sets represent the perception of the input variable. After that, the Fuzzy Inference System 
(FIS) processes the fuzzy input sets with a set of if-then-else rules. The result is a fuzzy 
output. Next, the fuzzy output sets from all the rules are weighted and averaged into one 
final crisp value. 
Developing the knowledge base of the system is the objective of fuzzy modeling 
methodologies. Human experts help to build the system. They determine the fuzzy sets 
and the membership functions. Also, experts structure the set of rules based on how they 
interpret the characteristics of the variables of the system [42]. 
 One of the most popular fuzzy models is the Mamdani model [43]. It is also the 
model used in this work and it is formulated with respect to the fuzzy rules. 
 
( ) ( )BA rjjmjriini ythenxifRr ∈∧∈∧∈∀ ≤≤≤≤ 11:     
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where: 
  R is the set of linguistic rules 
n is the number of input variables 
  m is the number of output variables 
  xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n are the input variables 
  Ari , 1 ≤ j ≤ n are the fuzzy sets defined on the respective universes 
  yj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m are the output variables 
  Brj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m are the fuzzy sets defined for the output variables 
 
Finally, the deffuzification method used in this work is the centroid method. This 
is the most important deffuzification method and gives the center of area under the curve 
that represents the membership function of the fuzzy output [26].  
In this research, the fuzzy logic model for LOPA applies three sub systems. The 
fuzzy event tree (F-ET) calculates the frequency of the scenario. The severity fuzzy 
inference system (S-FIS) works in parallel with the F-ET system and estimates the 
severity of the consequences for the incident scenario. Finally, with the outputs of these 
systems the risk fuzzy inference system (R-FIS) provides a crisp risk index for further 
analysis and comparison [28]. 
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2. METHODOLOGY DESCRIPTION 
 
2.1. LOPA 
 
LOPA is a semi-quantitative risk assessment methodology. It is based on the 
concept of protective layers. Figure 2.1 shows the concept of layers of defense against a 
possible accident. In order to prevent the occurrence of an undesired consequence, a 
protection barrier is implemented. If the barrier works well, no more protection layers 
are required. However, there is no perfect protection barrier and several are needed to 
reduce the risk to tolerable levels. LOPA is useful to reduce the risk of a process to a 
tolerable level through the analysis of independent protection layers (IPLs). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Layers of defense against undesired accidents 
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Another representation for LOPA in the context of quantitative risk analysis 
(QRA), is presented in figure 2.2. Each ILP reduces the frequency of the event if it is 
successful. LOPA corresponds to a path in the event tree. Usually, this path leads to the 
worst consequence. Whereas the event tree shows all the possible consequences, LOPA 
works only with a cause and consequence pair. The objective is to choose the scenarios 
that represent the higher risk to the system. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Comparison of LOPA and event tree analysis [22] 
 
LOPA methodology is developed in several steps. Figure 2.3 shows a cyclic 
pattern in application of LOPA. The steps are summarized as follows: 
 
Step 1. Indentify the consequence to screen the scenarios. 
Based on the information generated in PHA, scenarios are screened based on the 
consequence. The limits of the consequence criteria depend on the company or the 
analyst. Some criteria only include the magnitude of the release while others include the 
harm to the people, the environment and the property. 
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Figure 2.3 LOPA steps [25] 
 
Step 2. Select an accident scenario. 
The scenario is a cause-consequence pair. Only one pair goes through the entire 
process at a time. Scenarios are indentified in another analysis, for example PHA. 
 
Step 3. Identify the initiating event of the scenario and determine the initiating event 
frequency (events per year). 
Initiating events have to lead to the consequence if all the safeguards fail. Ideally, 
frequency of the initiating events should be available from plant specific data, but they 
are difficult to find. Other option is to work with generic data such as OREDA [44] and 
CCPS [25]. In this case, the information is statistically reliable but does not consider the 
specific characteristics of the case under study. The last approach to obtain initiating 
event frequency is to combine generic and specific plant data using Bayesian logic. 
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Step 4. Identify the IPLs and estimate the probability of failure on demand of each 
IPL. 
Safeguards indentified in the qualitative analysis are screened using the criteria 
of independence to determine if they can be considered independent protection layers. 
This step includes the estimation of the probability of failure on demand (PFD) for each 
IPL in the same way as frequency of the initiating event. 
 
Step 5. Estimate the risk for the scenario by mathematically combining the 
consequence, initiating event, and IPL data. 
In the more general case the frequency of the consequence is determine as 
follows: 
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where 
fic = frequency for consequence C for initiating event i 
fiI = initiating event frequency for initiating event i 
PFDij = Probability of failure on demand of the jth IPL that protects against consequence 
C for initiating event i. 
 
Step 6. Evaluate the risk to reach a decision concerning the scenario. 
Risk estimation for each scenario is compared with the tolerable risk criteria 
established by the organization. Generic criteria are also available for comparison. CCPS 
[22] presents two risk criteria based on inclusion of human harm in the risk. Without 
human harm the tolerable risk is less than 5101 −× /year and action required criteria is less 
than 4101 −× /year. When considering human harm the maximum tolerable risk criteria is 
less than 5101 −× /year and action required criteria is less than 3101 −× /year. 
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2.2. FUZZY LOGIC 
 
The motivation for developing fuzzy logic and fuzzy models is based on the fact 
that traditional bivalued logic and probability theory are not enough to solve problems 
characterized by high uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity [46].  
Risk assessment of ammonia refrigeration systems is a real-world problem where 
a large number of factors and variables interact in non-linear fashions and uncertainty is 
non-statistical in principle. The objective of this project is the fuzzification of the risk 
assessment for ammonia refrigeration systems through the application of the Fuzzy 
LOPA model. 
 
2.2.1. FUZZY SETS 
 
The traditional approach considers a crisp set characterized by a function that 
takes values of one or zero when an element belongs or does not belong to the set. The 
function is called the characteristic function and can be generalized by assigning values 
in the interval [0,1]. In this way, when the characteristic function has the value of one or 
zero, the case is reduced to the characteristic function for crisp sets. 
When the characteristic function takes values between one and zero, it represents 
partial degrees of membership of the element to the set. The generalized characteristic 
function is called the membership function and it is defined as: 
 
]1,0[: →XAµ  where   Xx ∈  
 
X is a classical set of objects called the universe and the generic elements of the universe 
are denoted as x. The fuzzy set A, is a subset of X and does not have a sharp boundary 
due to the membership function ranging from 0 to 1. The complete characterization of A 
can be expressed as:  
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Typical membership functions are shown in figure 2.4. Types are a) trapezoidal, 
b) triangular, c) Gaussian and d) bell-shaped. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Membership functions 
 
This research uses continuous universe of discourse. Accordingly, the range of 
the universe X is partitioned into overlapping subranges. A membership function 
delimitates the subranges and it is identified with a linguistic label that determines the 
linguistic value to the set. This concept is represented in figure 2.5 for the concept of the 
variable frequency and the different linguistic values in the context of process safety. 
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Figure 2.5 Linguistic variable frequency and linguistic values (i.e. unlikely) [25] 
 
The continuous grade of membership allows the description of vague concepts 
more properly. For example, statements such as “numbers greater than 100” and “about 
$10” can be represented as fuzzy sets as shown in figure 2.6. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Fuzzy sets representing vague linguistic statements [41] 
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2.2.2. LOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL OPERATIONS WITH FUZZY SETS 
 
Fuzzy sets allow the use of logical and mathematical operations. When the 
membership value is one or zero, the results are the same as the operations on ordinary 
sets. For example given two fuzzy sets A and B, the intersection and union are defined as 
follows [27]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ),,min,
,,max,
xxxXx
xxxXx
BABA
BABA
µµµ
µµµ
=∈∀
=∈∀
∩
∪
 
 
Here, ( )xBA∩µ  and ( )xBA∪µ  represent the membership functions of BA ∩ and 
BA ∪ respectively. The fuzzy union and intersection satisfy the Morgan’s law and the 
distributive and associative properties of classical sets. With the evolution of the fuzzy 
logic theory, several aggregation operators have been developed. Their function is the 
combination of several fuzzy sets into one single set [27].  
In addition, arithmetic operations are possible with fuzzy sets through the 
extension principle. The extension principle permits the fuzzification of mathematical 
structures based on set theory [45]. For example, using the extension principle, the 
arithmetic operation∗  is extended into ⊗ to combine fuzzy numbers according to: 
 
CBA =⊗  
( )( ){ }
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yxz
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C
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2.2.3. FUZZY SYSTEMS DESIGN 
 
There are several fuzzy logic methodologies [46]. They are used according to the 
data available to generate the membership functions of the system. When data are 
available, fuzzy neural networks can be used to generate membership functions and IF-
THEN rules. When information is insufficient, the model is developed based on the 
physical principles of the systems. Instead of an equation the fuzzy model is composed 
by IF-THEN rules derived from these principles. 
Other type of fuzzy modeling does not use IF-THEN rules. Instead, it works on 
the theory of fuzzy relational equations, but the linguistic meaning is not explicit and 
interpretation is more abstract. 
The fuzzy modeling method used in this research is based on linguistic modeling. 
Fuzzy sets and IF-THEN rules represent the selected linguistic variables. 
 
2.2.4. MAMDANI MODEL 
 
Among the methods based of fuzzy rules, the Mamdani model [43] is the more 
applicable to this case. Previous work has demonstrated the advantages of using this 
method in process safety risk assessment [25] [46]. The Mamdani model is easier to 
understand and the output can be defined as a fuzzy set. The result is a better 
interpretation of the fuzzy sets and the fuzzy rules. 
The Mamdani model uses groups of rules such as: 
 
Rule 1: IF x is Ai1 AND y is Cj1 THEN z is Ek1 
Rule 2: IF x is Ai2 AND y is Cj2 THEN z is Ek2 
… 
Rule r:  IF x is Air AND y is Cjr THEN z is Ekr 
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where A, C and E are fuzzy sets; x, y and z are the linguistic variables, and r corresponds 
to the number of rules. Connector AND can be replaced by OR according to the model 
requirements. They are evaluated as the intersection and union operators. 
After the rules have been evaluated, the fuzzy outcomes Ekr are aggregated with 
rk
n
r
EE
1=
∪=  . Finally the fuzzy value E represents the outcome of the whole inference 
system. Next, E is deffuzified in order to get a crisp value. Mathematical structure and 
definition of the aggregation methods has been presented in literature [47]. Figure 2.7, 
presents the Mamdani method applied to hazard estimation. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Mamdani fuzzy inference algorithm [46] 
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2.2.5. DEFFUZIFICATION METHOD 
 
Deffuzification converts the fuzzy outcome of the fuzzy model into a crisp number. It is 
defined as a function 1−F  that maps the fuzzy set A to an element x of the support of the 
output. Deffuzification is represented as. 
( ) xxFF →− :1  
Several deffuzification methods have been developed. The most important are the 
centroid, center of area and maxima methods. This research uses the centroid method. It 
is the most widely used method for the Mamdani method.  
 The centroid method calculates the center of gravity of the area delimited by the 
membership function of the output set [25][46] 
 
( )
( )∫
∫
−
dxx
dxxx
F
A
A
µ
µ
:1  
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. OVERALL RESEARCH FLOW 
 
The present methodology combines both the methodology for developing LOPA 
scenarios and the Fuzzy Logic LOPA. These approaches provide a framework to 
develop the base for an expert system of ammonia refrigeration risk assessment. Figure 
3.1 presents the overall research flow diagram. 
Ammonia refrigeration systems are well understood. They are considered as a 
mature technology and no changes in the main system have been developed in recent 
years.  
 
3.2. DEVELOPMENT OF INCIDENT SCENARIOS FOR LOPA 
 
Developing the incident scenario is critical for LOPA development. Usually, this 
activity is developed during the process hazard analysis (PHA). For example, 
information from HAZOP is used in LOPA as it is shown in figure 3.1. 
This research is based on the methodology developed by Markowski and Mannan 
[25] for LOPA scenarios development. Their methodology is based on the LOPA 
framework and it can be considered as a basis for and expert system. It consists of the 
following steps as presented in figure 3.2: 
1. Selection of hazardous target process 
2. Loss event selection 
3. Identification of an appropriate initiating event 
4. Severity of consequences estimation 
5. Identification of independent protection layers 
6. Documentation – event tree 
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I. Development of the incident 
scenarios
i. Process equipment classification 
and identification of hazardous 
equipment
ii. Loss events selection
iii. Identification of initiating 
events
Iv. Evaluation of severity of 
the consequences
v. Identification of IPLs and 
correspondent PFD
vi. Documentation
II. Estimation of the risk
III. Evaluation of the Risk
IV. Analysis of results, 
conclusions and 
recommendations
Equipment is classified in:  Storage, 
Piping, Transfer and Other
Selection of loss events with information 
from databases and HAZOP
Categories for classification : process 
upsets, equipment failure, human error, 
management oversight and external 
event.
Fuzzy 
LOPA 
System
Use of linguistic variables and If-Then 
rules to represent severity of the 
consequence (S-FIS)
The outcome frequency for the scenario 
is calculated as a fuzzy number and 
represented with linguistic variables.
Subcategory of frequency linguistic terms: 
Very high, high, moderate, low, very low, 
unlikely, remote. Fuzzy F-ET subsystem
Use of S-FIS and FET results to estimate 
the RISK (R-FIS). Fuzzy risk matrix and 
Fuzzy risk index  
Comparison of the risk level with common 
accepted values, CCPS risk criteria and 
generic risk matrix
Risk decision making
Inclusion of more layers of protection and 
SIL for SIF’s
Recommendations for safety 
improvement
 
Figure 3.1 Methodology of the research 
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Figure 3.2 Development of the scenarios methodology [25] 
 
The previous structure is adapted in this research to the ammonia refrigeration 
system to include the Fuzzy Logic structure. The final methodology is described in the 
following sections. 
 
3.2.1. PROCESS EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF 
HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT  
 
Ammonia refrigeration equipment is classified in five groups of equipment with 
specific codes: storage (EQ1), process (EQ2), piping (EQ3), transfer (EQ4) and other 
(EQ5). The detailed classification is presented in Appendix C. One specific activity is 
associated to the equipment. The original methodology has six different types of activity: 
chemical batch reaction, chemical continuous reaction, electrochemical operation, 
physical operation, onsite storage and outside storage and distribution. These activities 
are shown in Appendix D.  
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In ammonia refrigeration systems only physical operation and onsite storage are 
present. The codes for this type of activity classification are PhO for physical operation 
and OnS for onsite storage. 
Finally, hazardous substances in the system are classified according to the 
flammability, explosivity and reactivity characteristics. There are ten categories in the 
original methodology presented in Appendix E. For ammonia refrigeration systems 
several categories apply to ammonia. For this reason, only the names of the hazardous 
substances are used, ammonia and ammonia-lube oil mixtures.  
 
3.2.2. LOSS EVENTS SELECTION 
 
Potential loss events for hazardous processes are classified in thirteen categories. 
Only nine categories of the original classification are applicable for the ammonia 
refrigeration systems case: fire, explosion, physical explosion, pipe leak rupture, tank 
leak rupture, vessel collapse, release substance to water, release substance to ground, and 
other. Appendix F presents the loss event categories used for this research. 
 
3.2.2.1. HAZOP 
 
This research is based on real HAZOP studies developed in industry. Appendix B 
presents the P&IDs and HAZOP results for a typical ammonia refrigeration facility. This 
specific HAZOP study is used to develop the LOPA scenarios. Node 1 was validated 
through a validation session and the results are included in Appendix B.  
 
 
 31 
 
 
3.2.3. IDENTIFICATION OF INITIATING EVENTS 
 
Initiating events are classified into five categories: process upsets, technical 
failures, human errors, management oversights and external events. Each category has 
more detailed descriptions of the initiation events. They are presented in Appendix G. 
Assignment of a particular category is based on expert opinion. 
 
3.2.4. SEVERITY OF THE CONSEQUENCES 
 
Severities of the consequences are classified using the fuzzy logic approach. The 
section 3.3.3 covers this topic in detail. 
 
3.2.5. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LAYERS OF PROTECTION 
 
The safeguards identified in the HAZOP study are analyzed according to the 
CCPS methodology [22]. Only those safeguards that satisfy the criteria of specificity, 
independence, dependability and auditability are considered as IPLs for LOPA. 
Codification for IPLs is presented in Appendix H. Main categories are prevention 
layers, protection layers and mitigation layers. Each sub category has a specific code. 
 
3.2.6. DOCUMENTATION OF THE SCENARIOS 
 
  Information for each scenario is organized in LOPA worksheets. Figure 3.3 
presents the CCPS LOPA worksheet [22]. With the methodology for developing incident 
scenarios for LOPA a tag is included in the worksheet. This tag provides information 
about the entire scenario. For example, a scenario code: <LE1-A5-F-V-PU1-
(LSH/PSV/FFS)>, means “Rupture of storage tank with flammable liquid, failure of high 
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level sensor and pressure safety valve, and unsuccessful fire fighting system with 
catastrophic severity of the consequences”.  
 
3.3. FUZZY LOPA MODEL 
 
The fuzzy logic application to LOPA developed by Markowski and Mannan [25] is 
called fLOPA. The application begins with the information of the incident scenario and 
applies three sub systems as presented in figure 18. The outcome is a crisp value of the 
risk for the scenario. 
Information to develop the fuzzy inference systems for LOPA was obtained from 
ammonia refrigeration standards, literature and expert opinion. This information was 
critical to identify the linguistic variables and the relationship between them. The main 
objective is to determine the IF-THEN rules for the different subsystems.  
The second step is to define the fuzzy sets and the membership functions. These 
fuzzy sets represent the linguistic variables of the LOPA system. 
Finally, IF-THEN rules are developed following the Mamdani model [43]. They 
represent the general knowledge about the ammonia refrigeration system. With the 
membership functions for the variables and the set of IF-THEN rules the inference 
system is applicable to different scenarios.  
fLOPA applies three subsystems as it is shown in figure 3.4. The Fuzzy Event Tree 
(F-ET) calculates the frequency of accident scenario. The Severity Fuzzy Inference 
System (S-FIS) calculates the severity of the consequence for the scenario and works in 
parallel with the F-ET. These two systems provide the information for the Risk Fuzzy 
Inference System (R-FIS). This system calculates a crisp risk index to be used for 
decision making. 
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Figure 3.3 CCPS LOPA work sheet 
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Figure 3.4 Structure of fLOPA [25] 
 
3.3.1. IIAR’S OSHA COMPLIANCE RISK MATRIX 
 
OSHA’s PSM requires qualitative evaluation of the possible consequences in 
ammonia refrigeration systems [9]. Risk matrix is used to this purpose. Ranking the risk 
is developed following the next steps: 
 
1) Consequences of each scenario identified in the PHA and the engineering and 
administrative controls (E/A) are compared with the consequences scale. The 
number that better matches the severity of the consequence is recorded. 
2) Considering the severity category founded in step 1, the E/A controls and the 
information for the scenario, a frequency value is selected among the four 
possible categories. 
3) With the severity of the consequence and the frequency values, the risk of the 
scenario is obtained from the risk matrix. 
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The risk matrix is presented in figure 3.5. Risk ranges from high risks identified 
with the letter A, to low risks “D”.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 OSHA’s risk matrix 
 
Ranges of frequency and severity of the consequence are described in tables 3.1 
and 3.2 respectively. 
 
Table 3.1 Severity range for OSHA’s risk matrix [9] 
Severity Range Qualitative Safety Consequence Criteria 
Level 4 Incident Potential for multiple life-threatening injuries or fatalities 
Level 3 Incident Potential for a single life-threatening injury or fatality 
Level 2 Incident Potential for an injury requiring a physician’s care 
Level 1 Incident 
Restricted to local vicinity, with potential injuries requiring no 
more than first aid 
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Table 3.2 Frequency range for OSHA’s risk matrix [9] 
Frequency Range Qualitative Frequency Criteria 
Level 4 
Events expected to occur yearly. Examples include single 
instrument or valve failures; hose leaks; or human error. 
Level 3 
Events expected to occur several times during the lifetime of the 
refrigeration system. Examples include dual instrument or valve 
failures; hose ruptures; or piping leaks 
Level 2 
Events expected to occur no more than a few times during the 
lifetime of the refrigeration system. Examples include: 
combinations of instrument failures and human errors; or full-bore 
failures of small process lines or fittings 
Level 1 
Events not expected to occur during the lifetime of the 
refrigeration system. Examples include multiple instrument or 
valve failures or human errors; or spontaneous failures of tanks or 
process vessels. 
 
In this research, the Fuzzy-LOPA methodology is developed with the 
information provided by the IIAR’s OSHA Risk Matrix. The linguistic variables, fuzzy 
numbers and IF-THEN rules are designed to represent the knowledge contained in this 
specific risk matrix. The following sections show how the methodology is implemented. 
 
3.3.2. FREQUENCY EVENT TREE 
 
The original methodology transforms the frequency calculation of an accident 
scenario into the domain of fuzzy logic. The objective is to avoid the increasing 
complexity if many rules are formulated to represent this case as an inference system. 
When k variables are represented by n membership functions, the number of rules is kn. 
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 This problem is called “rule explosion” [25]. Avoiding this problem is possible 
through the adaptation of the classical expression: 
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The previous aggregation method of fuzzy numbers gives a fuzzy outcome; in 
this case, the frequency of the initiating event. After the defuzzification process, a crisp 
frequency value is available for the risk inference system.  
A disadvantage of the previous procedure is that after defuzzification of the 
fuzzy frequency, the crisp frequency value requires fuzzification again in order to apply 
the risk inference system. The result is a more complex solution of the problem of risk 
assessment for ammonia refrigeration systems using the LOPA methodology. 
This research avoids the previous problem working directly with the frequency 
values of the traditional approach as an input variable for the risk fuzzy inference system 
and defining the membership function accordingly. Therefore, is easier for the analyst to 
apply the fuzzy methodology. 
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Also, the original linguistic categories are adapted to the IIAR’s OSHAS risk 
compliance matrix. Table 3.3 presents the original categorization. 
 
Table 3.3 Categorization of the outcome frequency [25] 
Subcategory of Frequency-
Linguistic term 
Meaning Range of Frequency 
[1/year] 
Very High (VH) Frequently met in industry f >10-1 
High (H) Quite possible 10-2≤ f ≤ 10-1 
Moderate (M) Occasional 10-3≤ f ≤ 10-2 
Low (L) Unusual but possible 10-4≤ f ≤ 10-3 
Very Low (VL) No likely to occur 10-5≤ f ≤ 10-4 
Unlikely (U) High unlikely 10-6≤ f ≤ 10-5 
Remote (R) Practically impossible f ≤ 10-6 
 
3.3.3. SEVERITY FUZZY INFERENCE SYSTEM (S-FIS) 
 
The severity of the consequences for a specific release scenario can be 
determined by a quantitative risk analysis. However, there are uncertainties related with 
the modeling of the release and the prediction of the severities for specific cases. To 
overcome this problem, a fuzzy inference system can be applied. 
Basically, the development of the severity inference system involves the design 
of the membership functions for the input and output variables, and the design of the IF-
THEN rules. The final outcome is a crisp value for severity of the consequence for the 
specific scenario. 
In this research, the original methodology has been modified because ammonia is 
the only substance of interest. In addition, the knowledge about ammonia refrigeration 
systems from expert opinion and regulations is included.  
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According to the IIAR’s OSHA risk compliance matrix, the severity of the 
consequence is result of the combination of magnitude of the loss, expressed in terms of 
life threatening injuries or fatalities, injuries and the extension of the medical care 
required. These three variables constitute the inputs to the inference system. 
Life threatening injuries or fatalities variable (LT-F) has two categories or 
linguistic values applicable to this case, LT-F equal to one, and LTF>1. IIAR considers 
that more that one life threatening injury or fatality leads to a catastrophic risk scenario, 
whereas one threatening injury or fatality represents a high risk scenario. Figure 3.6 
shows the membership function for this input variable.  
The universe of discourse is x = [0, 10]; number 10 is used for cases with more 
that 10 fatalities or life threatening injuries. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Membership function for life threatening injuries or fatalities variable 
 
The number of injuries and extension of the medical treatment are the others 
input variables of the severity inference system. These work together to determine the 
severity of the accident or release based on injuries that do not lead to fatalities. The 
membership functions are shown in figure 3.7 and 3.8. The universe of discourse for the 
injuries variable corresponds to the number of cases from 0 to 10 cases, and the 
linguistic values are low, moderate and high number of injuries.  
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Extension of medical treatment is categorized in a scale from 1 to 3. The value 
has to be an entire number which is determined by the expert opinion about the medical 
attention for the people injured after the release. The fuzzy numbers and linguistic 
variables associated are first aid, physician care and advanced medical care. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Membership functions of the variable injuries 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Membership functions of the variable extension of treatment 
 
 The LT-F and Injuries variables, represent the expert opinion about the presence 
of personal in the different sections of the ammonia refrigeration system. Also, they 
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contain information about the size of the ammonia release, duration of the incident and 
number of safeguards available. 
Figure 3.9 and 3.10 show the membership function for the output severity of the 
incident and the fuzzy graph obtained after defuzzification of all possible combination of 
outputs. The form of fuzzy set is based in previous works [25]. The linguistic terms used 
are Low, Moderate, High and Catastrophic. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Membership function of the output variable severity 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Fuzzy severity surface 
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 Rules to estimate the severity of the accident are presented in table 3.4 as a 
matrix.  
 
Table 3.4 IF-Then rules for severity. IF Number of Injuries is (__) AND 
Extension of Medical Treatment is (___) THEN Severity is (___) 
 
Severity Rules Extension of Medical Treatment 
Number of Injuries First Aid Physician Care Advanced 
High Moderate High Catastrophic 
Intermediate Moderate High High 
Moderate Low Moderate Moderate 
  
3.3.4. RISK FUZZY INFERENCE SYSTEM 
 
Among the different risk assessment methods, the most frequently used is the 
risk matrix. It allows ranking the risk of the process for further action through risk 
management activities. For ammonia refrigeration systems, the IIAR’s OSHA Risk 
Matrix is applied [9]. This research develops a fuzzy logic version of the IIAR’s OSHA 
Risk Matrix. 
 Developing the fuzzy risk matrix for ammonia refrigeration systems requires the 
implementation of the Risk Fuzzy Inference System (R-FIS). Input variables to the 
system are the frequency of the scenario and the output of the Severity Fuzzy Inference 
System (S-FIS). The outcome of the inference system is the fuzzy risk index and a final 
crisp risk value.  
 Severity of the scenario is represented in the same was as it is used in the S-FIS 
system. For the case of the frequency of the initiating event, the membership functions 
are presented in figure 3.11. The linguistic terms associated with the variable are: Very 
Low, Low, Medium and High. Definition of the membership functions type for the 
frequency and risk variables is based on the works of Markowski and Mannan [25]. 
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Gaussian type is used for the input and outcome variables and the ranges were obtained 
from the look-up tables provided by CCPS [22]. 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Membership functions for frequency of the initiating event 
 
The membership functions for the risk outcome are presented in figure 3.12. The 
linguistic terms for risk are: Acceptable, Tolerable, Tolerable not Acceptable and Non 
Acceptable, and their definition are presented in table 3.5. Finally, the set of rules for the 
risk fuzzy inference system and the surface risk after evaluation of all the rules are 
presented in table 3.6 and figure 3.13 respectively.  
 
 
Figure 3.12 Membership functions for risk 
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Table 3.5 Fuzzy sets and linguistic terms for fuzzy risk matrix 
 
Linguistic 
variables 
Linguistic 
Term 
Definition Description 
Range 
Universe of 
Discourse 
High Events expected to 
occur yearly.  10
-2
 ≤ F< 1 
Medium Events expected to 
occur several times 
during the lifetime of 
the refrigeration 
system.  
10-4 ≤ F< 10-1 
Low Events expected to 
occur no more than a 
few times during the 
lifetime of the 
refrigeration system.  
10-6 ≤ F< 10-3 
Frequency (F) 
Unlikely Events not expected to 
occur during the 
lifetime of the 
refrigeration system.  
10-7 ≤ F< 10-5 
XF ∈(1, 10-7) 
Catastrophic Potential for multiple 
life-threatening 
injuries or fatalities 
3< C ≤4 
High Potential for a single 
life-threatening injury 
or fatality 
2< C ≤4 
Moderate Potential for an injury 
requiring a 
physician’s care 
1< C ≤3 Severity of 
consequences 
Low Restricted to local 
vicinity, with potential 
injuries requiring no 
more than first aid 
1< C ≤2 
XC ∈(1, 4) 
Acceptable 
(A) 
No action required 0 ≤ R ≤ 2 
Tolerable (T) Action based on ALARP principles 1 ≤ R ≤ 3 
Tolerable-
unacceptable 
(TNA) 
Indication for 
improvements in the 
medium term 
2 ≤ R ≤ 4 
Risk 
Unacceptable 
(NA) 
Must be reduced 
immediately 3 ≤ R ≤ 5 
XR ∈(1,5) 
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Table 3.6 Risk rules. IF Frequency is (__) AND Severity is (___) THEN Severity 
is (___) 
 
Severity 
Risk Rules 1 2 3 4 
Frequency Low Moderate High Catastrophic 
4 High T (2) TNA (3) NA (4) NA (4) 
3 Medium T (2) TNA (3) TNA (3) NA (4) 
2 Low A (1) T (2) TNA (3) TNA (3) 
1 Unlikely A (1) A (1) T (2) T (2) 
 
 
 Figure 3.13 Fuzzy risk surface 
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4. RESULTS OF THE METHODOLOGY AND VALIDATION 
 
4.1. HAZOP VALIDATION AND SCENARIO MAKING 
 
The HAZOP studies for ammonia refrigeration system were obtained from a 
consulting firm in the Houston area. From these studies, one was selected and represents 
a typical facility. The case was selected as the model for this research. Appendix B 
presents the P&IDs and HAZOP results. 
Thirty one nodes are part of the study. Node one is the ammonia receiver. It is 
one of the most critical units in the systems because it contains a large amount of 
ammonia under high pressure. Charging of ammonia for starting up and making up are 
also considered in the analysis of this node. These operations increase the risk of 
ammonia release in the facility. For the reasons above, node one is selected for the 
validation session of the existing HAZOP. 
The validation session was done by a team which consisted of two post doctors, 
and four graduate students from the Artie Mcferrin department of chemical engineering 
at Texas A&M University and the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center on July 3, 
2008. The results are shown in Appendix B as complement of the original HAZOP 
study.  
Even though the HAZOP validation session was focused only in one node, the 
group agreed in the deep, format, presentation and completeness of the HAZOP study 
and the P&IDs. In this way, information from other nodes was made available for 
developing of the LOPA scenarios.  
Four scenarios were selected for this research based on the most common 
incidents reported by EPA [3]. Scenarios are presented in table 4.1. Appendix I, presents 
the results of the scenario classification and codification. 
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Table 4.1  LOPA incident scenarios 
 
Scenario 
No. 
Node 
No. 
Causes Consequences Scenarios 
1 1 Hose failure 
Release of ammonia 
to atmosphere 
resulting in 
respiratory injury 
and/or chemical burn 
to personnel in close 
proximity and 
potential 
environmental issue. 
Failure of charging hose 
during charging of receiver 
tank 
 
2 1 
Truck pump set too 
high-Operator 
Error 
 
Rapid charging of 
ammonia to Receiver 
vessel resulting in 
high pressure in RC-
301 with release of 
ammonia  
Rapid charging of ammonia to 
Receiver vessel resulting in 
high pressure in RC-301 
3 2 
Inadvertent loss of 
oil seal on 
Recirculating 
Pump. 
Release of ammonia 
in machine room 
(loss of containment) 
Loss of oil seal in recirculation 
pump with potential release in 
machinery room 
4 3 
PV-40041 sticks 
open 
 
Subsequent hot 
suction discharge gas 
blow through to IC-
302 and pressure 
increase in IC-302 
with potential for 
hydraulic shock in 
line HPL-5013 and 
failure valve 
(potential for loss of 
containment) 
Loss of level in PD-301 
(Transfer Station) 
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4.2. TABLES FOR FREQUENCY RATES AND PROBABILITY 
 
The following tables show the initiating event frequency data and the probability 
of failure on demand (PFD) used in this research. This section is a summary of the 
information required to calculate the reduced event frequency according to the LOPA 
methodology. Sources of the information are included in the tables. CCPS [22] [48], 
OREDA [44] and direct manufacturer information [49] were used in this research. 
 
Table 4.2  Frequency of the initiating events 
 
Class Frequency Data 
Event Min/Lower Typical/Mean  Max/Upper Reference  
Hose failure 8.7 x 10-5 5 x 10-3 1.9 x 10-2 [48], CCPS, p 187 
Human Error, 
Operator 
failure/opportunity 
10-3 10-2 10-1 [22], CCPS, p.71 
Pump seal failure 10-2 10-1 10-1 [22], CCPS, p.71 
Pressure valve 
fails open 2.4 x10
-3
 3.14 x10-2 1.08 x10-1 [48], CCPS, p.201 
 
Assuming that there is periodical testing of equipment and the unplanned 
demands occur at a random time within the testing cycle, the PFD can be approximately 
estimated by: 
2
testTPFD
λ
=
 
where testT   is the proof test interval. In this research a test interval of 1 year is assumed. 
In this way frequency data is converted to PFD. 
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Table 4.3  Failure probabilities of IPLs 
 
Class Probability Data 
IPL Min/Lower Typical/Mean  Max/Upper Reference  
Operator follows 
procedure to shutdown 
operation.  
1 x 10-1 1x 10-1 1 [22], CCPS,  
PSV 0.0079 x10-3  0.212 x 10-3 0.798 x 10-3 [48], CCPS,  
Low Level Shutdown 
 7.5 x 10-4  [48], CCPS,  
BPCS 1 x 10-2 1x 10-1 1x 10-1 [22], CCPS,  
Level detector and 
alarm  2.6 x 10
-1
  [48], CCPS,  
Pressure alarm 8.7 x 10-5 2.1 x 10-2 8.1 x 10-2 [44], OREDA 
Ventilation system 
failure. Motor driven 
fans. Fail while 
running 
1.5 x 10-2 4 x10-2 1 x 10-1 [48], CCPS, 
Ventilation system 
failure. Motor driven 
fans. Fail to start on 
Demand 
9.44 x 10-3 2.08 x10-2 7.69 x10-1 [48], CCPS, 
Ammonia Detector  1 x10-2  [49], General Monitors 
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4.3. RESULTS OF RISKS 
 
4.3.1. HIGH PRESSURE RECEIVER (NODE1) 
 
In the high pressure receiver area, two scenarios were developed. 
 
4.3.1.1. SCENARIO 1 – FAILURE OF CHARGING HOSE 
 
Ammonia can be released during charging operation if rupture of the charging 
hose occurs. Personnel working in the surroundings can be affected seriously due to 
inhalation and chemical burn. Also, depending on the localization of the receiver tank, 
the risk for an explosion exits. Environment can be affected but the impact is less severe 
when compared with the consequences for people in the area. Due to ammonia 
vaporization, the temperature decreases, freezing of enclosed liquid in piping and 
thermal stresses can occur, leading to other accident scenarios. 
The rupture frequency of the charging hose and the PFD for the IPL are 
presented in table 4.1. Next, the initiating event frequency for the scenario is obtained.  
Severity is determined using the severity fuzzy inference system (S-FIS). This 
accident affects mainly workers in the area because it is a liquid release of ammonia. 
The number of possible fatalities or life threatening injuries is assumed to be one, and 
the number of injures is three, the operator of the tank truck, the supervisor of the 
operation and another company worker. The level of medical attention is physician care. 
The estimated severity index is 3 and the fuzzy risk index is 3. It corresponds to the 
linguistic variable TNA for risk. This scenario is tolerable but more action is required in 
the medium term.  
In order to reduce the risk, it is possible to reduce the severity and the frequency 
of the initiating event. If the occupancy of the working area is reduced to two people and 
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the ventilation system of the machinery room is operating during the charging of 
ammonia, the evaluation of the fuzzy severity index gives 1.9.  
Finally the risk index gives 2.08 and the risk becomes tolerable. Figure 4.1 shows 
the contribution of all the risk rules and the risk index for scenario 1, and table 4.4 
presents the LOPA worksheet for this case. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Final rules inference for scenario 1 
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Table 4.4  LOPA worksheet scenario 1 
 
Scenario No. 
1 
EQ19-PhO-S1-LE8-HR7-OP 
Scenario Title: Human error-Uncoupling of charging hose 
during charging of receiver tank 
Scenario Identification: 
Node No. 
1 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Release of ammonia to atmosphere resulting 
in respiratory injury and/or chemical burn to 
personnel in close proximity and potential 
environmental issue. 
  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency)    
Initiating event 
(frequency) Hose failure  5 x 10
-3
 
Enabling event 
or condition  N/A  
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
  5 x 10-3 
Operator follows procedure to shutdown 
operation.   1 x 10
-1
 
   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
   
Total PFD for all IPLs   1 x 10-1 
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
Frequency (F) 
(Log F)  
5 x 10-4 
(-3.3) 
Severity 
Life threatening: 1 
Injuries: 3  
Medical treatment: Physician Care 
Fuzzy Severity Index: 3 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) TNA (3) – More action required 
Yes, but additional 
improvements are required 
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Reducing the occupation of the zone to 2 people wearing protective clothes. 
Also, because the hose goes trough the machine room, during charging 
operation the fans of the ventilation system should be turned on.  
PFD= 4 x 10-2 
Risk calculation after 
actions required 
F = 2 x 10-5 ; Log F = - 4.7; Fuzzy Severity index: 1.9;  
Fuzzy Risk Index: T (2.1) 
Notes 
Safeguards: Pre-startup check, Personnel monitoring, BPCS-level control 
and alarm. 
Human action with PFD as IPL because the BPCS level indicator is part of 
this IPL. Human action with 10 min response time. 
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If only severity is modified, the outcome of the S-FIS is 2.8 and the risk is still 
TNA. By the other hand, if only the use of the ventilation system acting as an IPL is 
considered, the result is a risk index of 2.9, obtaining the same level of risk of the initial 
case.  
With the original IIAR’s OSHA risk compliance matrix, the scenario 1 is high 
severity due to the possibility of one fatality. The frequency is considered medium and 
the final outcome for risk is TNA (3). This is the same result as the fuzzy LOPA method 
presented above. 
In order to reduce the risk, the key is to find the optimum combination of 
additional IPLs and reduction of severity. Frequency ranges for low and very low event 
frequency are 10-6 ≤ F< 10-3 and 10-7 ≤ F< 10-5 respectively. In this way, the options for 
PDF of new IPLs added to the system with the purpose of reducing the initiating event 
frequency from 5 x 10-4 to the low and very low level are multiple. This situation let the 
analyst the problem of determine the proper IPLs to satisfy the risk criteria. The fuzzy 
LOPA method helps to evaluate the options consistently.  
 
4.3.1.2. SCENARIO 2 – RAPID CHARGING OF AMMONIA RESULTING IN HIGH 
PRESSURE 
 
This scenario analyzes the rapid charging of ammonia into the high pressure 
receiver due to human error setting up the tank truck pump. The consequence is the 
overpressure of the receiver and release of ammonia in the plant, affecting the personnel, 
community and environment. 
The frequency of the initiating event is taken from CCPS [22]. The typical value 
for human error is considered for the calculations. According to table 4.1 the frequency 
of human error following procedures is 1 x10-2/opportunity.  
The independent protection layers to consider are: process safety valves and 
inherently safer design. Process safety valves (PSV) are installed on the top of receiver 
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RC-301. They are installed in the 1oo2 voting multiple system. It is assumed that one 
PSV has the relief capacity for any possible overpressure. Because the PSV are the same 
type, common cause factor (β) is considered. The calculation of the PFD is performed 
according to: 
)()(
)
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The (β) factor for valves with a common pipe connection to a storage tank is 
considered as 30%, because the shared pipeline contributes to the common cause failure. 
Inherently safer design is an optional IPL that could be considered according to 
the criteria of the LOPA analyst. In this scenario the maximum allowable working 
pressure (MAWP) is 250 psig and the tank has been hydrotested up to 350 psig. Use of 
MAWP as an IPL requires proper inspection and maintenance. In this research it is 
considered that the tank is under mechanical integrity program but inherently safer 
design is only a safeguard. Table 4.5 presents the LOPA worksheet and the PFD for the 
protection layers 
Frequency of the mitigated consequence is 6.4 x 10-7/year. According to the 
membership function for frequency, the event can be considered “unlikely” but also it 
could be part of the “low” frequency set. Fuzzy logic helps to consider both 
contributions. Through the evaluation of the IF-THEN rules, each contribution of 
frequency is weighted and included in the final outcome of risk. Figure 4.2 shows the 
contribution of all the risk rules and the risk index for scenario 2. 
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Table 4.5  LOPA worksheet scenario 2 
 
Scenario No. 
2 
EQ11-PhO-S1-LE5-HR3-RV 
Scenario Title: Rapid charging of ammonia to Receiver 
vessel resulting in high pressure in RC-301 
Node No. 
1 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Rapid charging of ammonia to Receiver 
vessel resulting in high pressure in RC-301 
with release of ammonia  
  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency)    
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
Truck pump set too high-Operator Error 
Human Error.  1 x 10
-2
 
Enabling event 
or condition    
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
  1 x 10-2 
PSV-90011/90021  6.4 x 10-5 
   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
   
Total PFD for all IPLs   6.4 x 10-5 
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
Frequency (F) 
(Log F)  
6.4 x 10-7 
(-6.2) 
Severity 
Life threatening injuries: >3 
Injuries: 6 
Medical treatment: Physician Care 
Fuzzy Severity Index: 3.5 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) 2,5 (TNA-0.4, T-0.6)–  Yes, Tolerable level of risk 
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
No more action required 
Risk calculation after 
actions required  
Notes 
Safeguards:  
MAWP is 250 psig (Hydrotested to 375 psig),  
BPCS: Level detector, pressure indicator  
 56 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Final rules inference for scenario 2 
 
Severity corresponds to an incident that affects people in the vicinity of the 
facility because it is a gas release of ammonia. For this case it is assumed that no 
fatalities occur but there are several life-threatening-injuries and the less serious injured 
people requiring physician care attention. Fuzzy severity risk index is 3.5 and the risk 
fuzzy inference system gives a risk index of 2.5. Table 4.6 shows the risk values for the 
fuzzy system and the traditional risk matrix.  
The risk fuzzy value has the grade of membership is higher for the Tolerable 
fuzzy set, the linguistic risk term is Tolerable, and the scenario requires only actions to 
reduce the risk ALARP. 
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The traditional approach using the IIAR’s OSHA categorization gives a severity 
level of “catastrophic” and a frequency that could be “low” or “unlikely” category. 
Depending on the frequency category selected, the risk could be Tolerable unacceptable 
(TNA) or Tolerable (T). Again, the expert opinion is required to determine which 
category is appropriate to this scenario. If the approach is conservative, the category 
tolerable non-acceptable should be selected, and additional action is required in the 
medium term. Otherwise, the risk is Tolerable and the ALARP criteria prevail. 
 
Table 4.6  Fuzzy and traditional risk results for scenario 2 
 
 Fuzzy value Traditional Risk Matrix 
3 (TNA- if frequency is low) Risk 2,5 (TNA-0.4, T-0.6)– 2 (T – if frequency unlikely) 
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4.3.2. LOW PRESSURE RECIRCULATOR (NODE 2) 
 
The low pressure recirculator RV 301 is an intermediate storage tank for 
ammonia that works around 10 psig. Appendix B presents the P&ID for this unit. It 
receives the low pressure ammonia from the spiral freezer. This type of freezer is the 
most common in the refrigeration industry. It consists of rails that guide a belt to the 
refrigerated space. It is suitable for continuous product freezing operation.  
The function of RV-301 is to receive and recirculate ammonia to the spiral 
freezer and provide low pressure ammonia to the low and high stage compression 
system.  
 
4.3.2.1. SCENARIO 3 – LOSS OF SEAL OIL ON RECIRCULATING PUMP 
 
This scenario analyzes the loss of seal in rotating equipment. Failure of the seal 
in refrigerant pumps is one frequent cause of ammonia release according to EPA [3]. 
IIAR’s Guidelines [11] [14] recommend isolation, ventilation and defrost of the 
ammonia pumps monthly. 
 The Cause of the accident scenario is the loss of seal in the refrigeration pump 
connected to the low pressure receiver RV-301. Frequency of the initiating event is         
1 x 10-1 according to the look up table 4.2. 
 Several safeguards that could be helpful to avoid or mitigate this scenario are 
present. Mechanical integrity plan, inspection and procedures are useful to prevent 
malfunction of the equipment but they can not be considered as independent layers of 
protection. There are two safeguards that can be considered as IPLs, Low Alarm Level 
(LAL) on Seal Oil followed by operator action after alarm and low level shutdown on 
pumps. Table 4.7 shows the LOPA worksheet for this scenario. 
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Table 4.7  LOPA worksheet scenario 3 
 
Scenario No. 
3 
EQ11-PhO-S1-LE5-TF12-OP-
LLS 
Scenario Title: Loss of oil seal in recirculation pump with 
potential release in machinery room 
Node No. 
11 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Release of ammonia in machine room (loss 
of containment)   
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency)    
Initiating event 
(frequency) 
Inadvertent loss of oil seal on Recirculating 
Pump.  1 x 10
-1
 
Enabling event 
or condition    
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
  1 x 10-1 
LAL on Seal Oil and Operator follows 
procedure to shutdown operation after 
alarm.  
 1.3 x 10-1 
Low Level Shutdown on  
Pumps PU-701A/B  7.5 x 10
-4
 
Independent 
Protection Layers 
   
Total PFD for all IPLs   1 x 10-4 
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
Frequency (F) 
(Log F)  
1 x 10-5 
(-5) 
Severity 
Life threatening injuries: 0 
Injuries: 2 
Medical treatment: First Aid 
Fuzzy Severity Index: 1.8 
(Moderate) 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) 2,06 (T) Yes, Tolerable level of risk 
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
No more action required 
Risk calculation after 
actions required  
Notes Other safeguards : ammonia detectors and alarms 
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Mitigated event frequency calculation gives 1 x 10-5/year. This frequency is 
considered category “low” according to the membership ranges for frequency in table 
3.5 and figure 3.11. 
 After released, it is considered that ammonia causes only injures that require first 
aid. It is assumed that the rate of the release is very low and the ammonia detector 
activates the alarm. This accident impacts a low occupied area because personnel visit 
this area for inspection only. Severity is calculated considering this information and the 
severity fuzzy index is 1.8. Looking at the fuzzy set for severity, it is noticed that this 
value has more membership with the moderate category (0.6) than the low category 
(0.2). 
 Fuzzy risk calculation gives a value of 2.06 that corresponds to the tolerable level 
of risk (T). Future actions are based in the ALARP concept. In contrast, the traditional 
risk matrix gives a scenario with low severity. Scenario 3 frequency belongs to the 
categories low and unlikely, but the final outcome for both cases is a risk value of 1. 
Table 4.8 shows the results for the traditional LOPA and fuzzy LOPA analysis. 
 Fuzzy LOPA provides different values for severity and risk than the traditional 
LOPA. They are explained by the fact that in the S-FIS, severity is also determined by 
the number of people injured. Traditional severity index considers only the type of 
medical attention required. This higher severity determines the value of risk in the fuzzy 
logic LOPA method. 
 
Table 4.8  Scenario 3 results 
 
Scenario 3 
evaluation 
Traditional LOPA Fuzzy LOPA 
Frequency Severity Risk Value 
Risk 
Category Severity  
Severity 
Linguistic 
category  
Risk 
Risk 
Linguistic 
category 
1 x 10 -5 1 1 Acceptable 1.8 Moderate 2.06 Tolerable (T) 
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4.3.3. SUCTION ACCUMULATOR ST-301 (NODE 3) 
 In general, ammonia refrigeration systems work over-feeded. It is common in 
this case to use gas driven systems instead of mechanical devices to make the ammonia 
flow through the units. The design is inherently safer because avoids the use of pumps 
where parts such as bearings and seals require special maintenance. 
In operation, the liquid and vapor mixture is returned from the evaporator to the 
accumulator vessel. Phase separation occurs and separated the dry vapor is directed to 
the compressor. Liquid in the accumulator is drained by gravity to a dump trap (PD 301) 
and intermittently transferred to a controlled-pressure receiver (CPR), vessel IC-302 in 
this case. From IC-302, partially subcooled liquid refrigerant is fed to the evaporator at 
the recirculating rate required for return to the suction accumulator. This configuration 
provides liquid refrigerant protection for the compressor and increases the use of the 
internal transfer surface of the evaporator. 
 
4.3.3.1. SCENARIO 4 – LOSS OF LEVEL IN TRANSFER STATION   
 
This scenario analyzes the failure of a pressure valve in the system. If the 
pressure valve PV- 40041 remains open, dump trap PD-301 loss ammonia level. Hot 
suction discharge gas from the compressor discharge flows through HPL-5013, 
increasing the pressure in the pressure receiver IC-302. High pressure gas can cause a 
hydraulic shock in the pipeline HPL-5013 with possible failure of valves in the line and 
release of high pressure ammonia gas. Appendix B presents the P&IDs and HAZOP for 
the scenario. 
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The cause of the incident is the failure of a pressure valve. The frequency of the 
spurious trip to close a pressure valve may be estimated with the CCPS data. For this 
scenario, one IPL is available. Pressure alarm followed by procedures to shutdown. The 
PFD of the pressure alarm is estimated with the OREDA data. It provides the failure 
frequency of a pressure sensor. The data is converted into PFD by using frequency-PFD 
conversion method. CCPS provides the PFD of the operator following procedures after 
alarm. It is assumed that the pressure alarm and the operator following procedures are 
independent each other and Boolean algebra is used to estimate the PFD of the IPL. 
Frequencies and PFDs are presented in tables 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. The mitigated 
event frequency is 3.7x 10-3/year. Table 4.9 shows the LOPA worksheet for the scenario. 
 This scenario is considered serious and the severity fuzzy index is estimated. It is 
assumed that there are one life threatening case and three injuries that require physician 
care. With these conditions, the outcome is a severity index of 3. The final fuzzy risk 
index gives a value of 3.09. This value corresponds to the category Tolerable-
unacceptable. It means that the scenario is acceptable but more action is required in the 
middle term. 
 63 
 
 
Table 4.9  LOPA worksheet scenario 4 
 
Scenario No. 4 
EQ1-PhO-S1-LE5-TF2-OP-LPA Scenario Title: Loss of level in PD-301 (Transfer Station) 
Node No. 
3 
Date Description Probability Frequency (per year) 
Consequence 
Description/Category 
Subsequent hot suction discharge gas blow 
through to IC-302 and pressure increase in 
IC-302 with potential for hydraulic shock in 
line HPL-5013 and failure valve (potential 
for loss of containment) 
  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency)    
Initiating event 
(frequency) PV-40041 sticks open  3.1 x 10
-2
 
Enabling event 
or condition    
Frequency of  
Unmitigated 
Consequence 
  3.1 x 10-2 
Pressure alarm followed by procedures 
Operator follows procedure to shutdown   1.21 x 10
-1 
   
Independent 
Protection Layers 
   
Total PFD for all IPLs   1.21 x 10-1 
Frequency 
of Mitigated 
Consequence (/year) 
Frequency (F) 
(Log F)  
3.7x 10-3 
(-2.4) 
Severity 
Life threatening injuries: 1 
Injuries: 3 
Medical treatment: Physician Care 
Fuzzy Severity Index: 3 
(High) 
Risk Tolerance 
Criteria Met? (Yes/No) 3.09 (TNA) 
Yes, but additional 
improvements are required 
Actions 
required to meet  
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Severity Reduction: 
Ammonia Detection (SIL 2-Manufacturer) PFD= 1 x 10-2 
Ventilation system, PFD = 2.08 x 10-1 
Final configuration PFD: 2.2 x 10-1 
Frequency Reduction: 
Detection system and Alarms, SIF with SIL 2 activates if PV-40041 fails 
Risk calculation after 
actions required 
F = 8 x 10-6 ; Log F = - 5.09; Fuzzy Severity index: 2;  
Fuzzy Risk Index: T (2) 
Notes 
Safeguards: Local Level Indication on PD-301, LAH-3014, LAHH-3013. 
Consider preparation of an emergency mitigation procedure for restoration 
of PD-301 to safe operating condition without creating a potential for 
thermal shock when closing off hot gas to PD-301  
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 Table 4.10 presents the results for risk. Traditional LOPA and fuzzy-LOPA 
estimate the same level of risk. However, fuzzy LOPA allows the analysis of mitigation 
layers of protection according to the CCPS guidelines [22]. A detection system for 
ammonia that activates the ventilation system is a mitigation protection layer. The PDF 
is obtained through the combination of the PFD for the ventilation system when it is 
required to start, and the PFD of the detection system. Boolean algebra applied to this 
system gives a PFD value of 2.2x 10-1.  
 Including this mitigation IPL, the number of injuries is the same but the type of 
medical care changes to first aid. The fuzzy severity index is 2, and the mitigated 
frequency of the initiating event is 8.1x 10-4. With these data, the fuzzy risk inference 
system calculates a risk value of 3. In this case the mitigation IPL is not enough to 
reduce the risk.  
Additional actions to reduce the risks include installing a Safety Instrumented 
Function (SIF) with a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of 2. SIF activates in case the pressure 
valve fails. The new reduced event frequency and fuzzy risk index are 8.1x 10-6 and 2 
(Tolerable) respectively. 
 
Table 4.10  Scenario 4 results 
 
Scenario 4 
evaluation 
Traditional LOPA Fuzzy LOPA 
Frequency Severity Risk Value 
Risk 
Category Severity  
Severity 
Linguistic 
category  
Risk 
Risk 
Linguistic 
category 
3.7 x 10 -3 3 3 
Tolerable-
unacceptable 
(TNA) 
3 High 3 
Tolerable-
unacceptable 
(TNA) 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1. SUMMARY 
 
Ammonia systems are the refrigeration system of preference for the cold storage 
and food processing. Its use is expected to be increased because its operation is 
economical, efficient and environmentally friendly. Although ammonia refrigeration 
systems have these advantages, ammonia is flammable and toxic. Therefore, it is very 
important to evaluate and control the risks of using ammonia in new and existing 
facilities. 
LOPA is a very cost effective way to determine the risk in chemical processes. It 
requires less time and effort and provides quantified results. However, information in 
many cases is scarce or highly uncertain for applying risk assessment techniques, 
especially in old facilities without appropriate records and practices. Fuzzy logic was 
developed to work with this type of conditions. Based on the idea of mimic how humans 
make decisions, fuzzy logic is a useful alternative to develop expert systems. 
This research applies fuzzy logic to develop the basis for an ammonia 
refrigeration LOPA expert system. It was developed to represent available knowledge 
about the process from ammonia refrigeration standards. IIAR’s OSHA risk matrix is the 
base for developing the different fuzzy sets that allow the construction of the two main 
inference systems used in this research.  
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The severity fuzzy inference system calculates the severity of a LOPA scenario 
as a result of the combination of three fuzzy sets, number of life threatening or deaths, 
number of injuries and type of medical attention required.  
The Risk Fuzzy Inference System calculates the risk of a scenario with the fuzzy 
severity index and the mitigated frequency of the initiating event for the same scenario. 
The result is the representation of the IIAR’s OSHA knowledge into the domain of fuzzy 
logic with the use of fuzzy inference systems. The utility of this work is to help the 
development of an expert system for LOPA application to ammonia refrigeration 
systems. With the HAZOP information of a real system, four scenarios were identified in 
a typical ammonia refrigeration system. The failure frequencies of initiating events and 
PFDs of the IPLs were obtained from available literature. The fuzzy LOPA methodology 
estimate the quantitative risk for each scenario. Based on the category of the risk index, 
risk decisions are made. 
In order to improve the safety of the system, recommendations were made to 
reduce the risk to tolerable levels using the fuzzy LOPA method. Table 5.1 shows the 
summary of the risk values and the recommendations. Additionally, table 5.2 presents 
the comparison of results using the traditional LOPA and risk matrix with the fuzzy 
LOPA method and fuzzy risk matrix. 
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Table 5.1  Risk summary of the accident scenarios 
 
No of 
Scenario 
Scenarios Failure 
Frequecny 
(/year) 
Fuzzy 
Severity 
Index 
Fuzzy 
Risk 
ranking 
Criteria 
met 
Recommendations 
1 
Failure of 
charging 
hose during 
charging of 
receiver 
tank 
5 x 10-4 
 
3 (High) 3 
Yeas, but 
more 
action is 
required 
in the 
middle 
term 
1. Reduction in 
occupation of 
the zone. 
Personnel 
wears 
protective 
cloths 
2. Ventilation 
system is on 
during 
charging 
3. Mechanical 
integrity 
program for 
the ammonia 
provider 
2 
Rapid 
charging of 
ammonia to 
receiver 
vessel 
resulting in 
high 
pressure in 
RC-301 
6.4 x 10-7 
3.5 (High 
and 
catastrophic) 
2.5 Yes, Tolerable 
1. Mechanical 
integrity plan. 
2. Installation of 
Pressure 
alarm 
3 
Loss of oil 
seal in 
recirculation 
pump with 
potential 
release in 
machinery 
room 
1 x 10-5 
 
1.8 
(Moderate) 
2.06 
 
Yes, 
Tolerable 
1. Installation of 
ammonia 
detector and 
alarms. 
 
4 
Loss of 
level in PD-
301 
(Transfer 
Station) 
3.7x 10-3 
 
3 (High) 3.09 
Yes but 
additional 
action is 
required 
1. Ammonia 
detector and 
alarms. 
2. SIF (SIL 2) 
activates on 
pressure valve 
failure 
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Table 5.2  Comparison of the accident scenarios 
 
Traditional LOPA -Risk 
Matrix Fuzzy logic LOPA Scenario Frequency (F) Severity Risk Severity Fuzzy Risk Index 
1 5 x 10 -4 3 3 High 3 3 (TNA) 
2 
6.4 x 10 -7 3 
3  
(F = low) 
2  
(F = unlikely) 
High & 
Catastrophic 3.5 
2,5 
(TNA-0.4, T-0.6) 
3 
1 x 10 -5 1 
1 
F=low, 
unlikely 
Moderate 1.8 2,06 (T) 
4 3.7 x 10 -3 3 3 High 3 3.09 (TNA) 
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5.2. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This work has introduced a modified fuzzy logic LOPA methodology for risk 
estimation in ammonia refrigeration systems. It produced comparable risk results as it is 
shown in table 5.1. The method takes into account the expert knowledge available in the 
form of standards and good industry practices for ammonia refrigeration systems. 
Membership functions were developed based on this information, scenarios were 
classified, and fuzzy inference systems estimate the severity and risk index. They 
represent the knowledge base of the fuzzy system. In this way, the method serves as a 
framework for developing an expert system for ammonia refrigeration system that helps 
in the implementation of OSHA’s PSM program.  
The fuzzy logic LOPA method is user friendly. Membership functions can be 
modified according to the criteria of the expert developing the risk assessment. This 
feature facilitates the expert work especially when assessing old refrigeration systems 
where appropriate information is scarce. 
The results show that the method is helpful analyzing mitigation IPLs. Impact of 
severity and frequency reduction on the risk is easily determined and compared when 
mitigation IPL is considered. 
In conclusion, this work shows that the fuzzy logic LOPA method is a useful tool 
to assess the risk in ammonia refrigeration systems and because it is flexible and user 
friendly, it can be implemented once the scenario is detected during a HAZOP or PHA 
studies.  
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5.3. FUTURE WORK 
 
To further improve of the method, membership functions for maintenance, 
training of the employees and other non quantitative variables can be implemented. 
Whereas these characteristics are not easy to include in traditional LOPA, the fuzzy 
logic LOPA method works with this information represented in fuzzy sets. 
This work was based on OSHA’s PSM. For this reason, on site facility 
consequences were mainly considered. As an improvement, outside facility 
consequences can be included and EPA’s Risk Management Program for Ammonia 
Refrigeration has to be considered. 
Finally, improvements related with the development of databases and software 
that eliminates the use of the Matlab’s fuzzy logic tool box is required. This computer 
aided tool will constitute the expert system for ammonia refrigeration systems based on 
fuzzy logic. 
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APPENDIX A   
PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF AMMONIA 
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PROPERTY VALUE 
Molecular weight 17.03 
Color None 
Physical state Gas 
Freezinf point - 108 F @ P =1 atm 
Boiling point - 28.01 F @ P =1 atm 
Critical pressure 1657 psia 
Critical temperature 271 F 
0.596 @ 32 F/1 atm/vapor 
Specific Gravity 
0.62 @ 60 F/liquid 
Specific volume 20.8 ft3/lb @ 32 F/1 atm/vapor 
Odor threshold 5 – 50 ppm 
Upper flammability limit 25 - 28 % 
Lower flammability limit 15 - 16% 
Ignition temperature 1204 F 
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NODE REF: 1 DOCUMENT REF: AL-A-P-0509  
DOCUMENT TITLE: High Pressure Receiver - RC-301 
ITEM: Ammonia Charging 
This node involves the charging of anhydrous ammonia from a vendor tank truck to the High Pressure Receiver RC-301.  This operation is 
conducted for initial charging of the refrigeration system and when additional ammonia is required, e.g. equipment added to system.  The 
ammonia is delivered via truck to the facility via a charging hose through the machine room.  Vessel RC-301, lines RV-9002, and RV-9001 
are included.  Ammonia truck driver has own PPE and he connects hose from truck to angle valve on RC-301 discharge line (HPL-5001).  
Company 1 personnel opens valve after driver connects hose and performs leak check.  Company 1 PPE consists of gloves, face shield, and 
respirator and NH3 meter accessible. 
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION 
Flow 
No/Low 
Inadvertent valve closure, flow 
switch failure, failure of truck 
pump,  
 
Inadvertent uncoupling of 
charging hose 
Failure to fill Receiver with 
sufficient charge of ammonia; 
operability issue 
 
Release of ammonia to 
atmosphere resulting in 
respiratory injury and/or 
chemical burn to personnel in 
close proximity and potential 
environmental issue 
Freq:  [3] 
Ctgy:   [1]  [2]  [3] 
Svrty:  [2]  [3]  [3] 
Risk:  [3] [4] [4] 
 
 
 
 
Pre-startup check 
 
Personnel monitoring charging 
can quickly mitigate incident 
 
Charging hose 
connection lock, dike 
around receiver, 
detection system, water 
spray system (water fog) 
Flow 
More/High 
Excessive pressure on 
ammonia truck or truck pump 
set too high 
Rapid charging of ammonia to 
Receiver vessel resulting in 
high pressure in RC-301 
Freq:  [3] 
Ctgy:   [1]  [2]  [3] 
Svrty:  [3]  [2]  [3] 
Risk:  [4] [3] [4] 
PSV-90011/90021 
 
RC-301 MAWP is 250 psig 
 
Hydrotested to 375 psig 
Level indicators 
Pressure indicator on top 
of RC-301 to shutdown 
truck pump, flow meter 
valve L-338. 
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NODE REF: 1        (continued) DOCUMENT REF: AL-A-P-0509 
ITEM: Ammonia Charging 
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION 
Flow 
Reverse 
Ammonia truck has low 
pressure (pressure in truck is 
lower than RC-301) 
Initial backflow of ammonia 
from  RC-301 into truck 
resulting in subsequent failure 
to charge or delay in charging 
refrigeration system; operability 
issue 
Typical pressure on RC-301 is 
140 psig; max 180 psig 
Check valve between 
valve L-338 and pump 
Flow 
Other 
Than 
Truck contains ammonia grade 
other than refrigeration 
Lower grade ammonia may 
contain water resulting in 
subsequent freezing in small 
bore lines and eventual failure 
of the line (loss of containment) 
 
NOTE: Loss of containment 
can result in severe personnel 
respiratory injuries, chemical 
burns, and environmental 
issues 
Freq:  [3] 
Ctgy:   [1]  [2]  [3] 
Svrty:  [2]  [2]  [2] 
Risk:  [3] [3] [3] 
Procedure: Company 1 checks 
truck manifest to ensure 
refrigeration grade ammonia 
 
Press 
No/Low 
See No/Low flow issues     
Press 
More/High 
See High/More Flow issues    
Temp 
No/Low 
None identified    
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NODE REF: 1        (continued) DOCUMENT REF: AL-A-P-0509 
ITEM: Ammonia Charging 
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION 
Temp 
More/High 
None identified    
Controls 
Issue 
Ammonia charge to system 
without safework practice in 
place  
Personnel omission or 
comission error during charging 
resulting in an inadvertent 
release of ammonia to the 
atmosphere and potential for 
personnel injury 
Freq:  [2] 
Ctgy:   [1]  [2]  [3] 
Svrty:  [2]  [2]  [3] 
Risk:  [2] [2] [3] 
None Consider preparation of a 
safework 
practice/procedure for the 
delivery (charging) of 
ammonia into the 
refrigeration system and 
developing a safety job 
analysis 
ACTION NO: 1   ASSIGNED TO: Company 1 
Human 
Factors 
Issue 
Personnel disconnect ammonia 
charging hose without purging 
line clear 
Inadvertent exposure to 
residual ammonia in hose 
resulting in chemical burn 
and/or respiratory injury 
Freq:  [3] 
Ctgy:   [1]  [2]  [3] 
Svrty:  [2]  [3]  [3] 
Risk:  [3] [4] [4] 
Connection hose has valve on 
end to preclude spillage of 
ammonia 
 
Truck driver disconnects hose 
Operating procedure 
Siting 
Issue 
Location of RC-301 requires 
routing of charging hose 
through  machine room 
See other consequences noted 
in this node 
 Procedure for charging, 
PPE. Work permit. 
Level 
No/Low 
None identified. Valves L-345 
and G-346 open. 
Ammonia release. Operability 
issues due to low level. 
Level indicators Check location of level 
indicators below 30% capacity 
required for RC-301. Low-low 
level indicator. 
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NODE REF: 1        (continued) DOCUMENT REF: AL-A-P-0509 
ITEM: Ammonia Charging 
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION 
Level 
More/High 
Ammonia is continuously 
charged from truck into RC-301 
 
Eventual overfilling of RC-301 
with ammonia resulting in high 
pressure in RC-301 and 
backflow to the condensers 
Freq:  [3] 
Ctgy:   [1]  [2]  [3] 
Svrty:  [3]  [3]  [2] 
Risk:  [4] [4] [3] 
PSV-90011/90021 
 
RC-301 MAWP is 250 psig 
 
LT-3011 (LAH-3011) 
 
Local level indication on RC-
301 (sight glass) 
Check valve in line CD-
5008-XR 
 
 
 86
 
 
 
NODE REF: 2 DOCUMENT REF: AL-A-P-0512/0517  
DOCUMENT TITLE: -45 Low Pressure Recirculator - RV-301 
ITEM: Low Temperature Recirculated Liquid to ST-301 
This node involves the low temperature recirculated liquid from RV-301 Recirculating Pumps, PU-701A/B to the -45 Suction Accumulator, 
ST-301 through XV-60181, including the recycle lines from PU-701A/B back to RV-301.  Also included is low temperature liquid line 2"-LTL-
6001-XR from IC-301 through XV-60011 to ST-301.  Equipment PU-107A/B and lines LTRL-6005, LTRL-6001, LTRL-6008, LTRL-6003, 
LTRL-6007, LTRL-6009, LTRL-6010, LTRL-6006, LTRL-6002, LTRL-6004, LTRL-6018, and LTL-6001 are included. 
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION 
Flow 
No/Low 
Inadvertent loss of 
Recirculating Pump or failure of 
pump motor 
 
 
 
 
XV-60181 fails or is 
inadvertently commanded 
closed  
 
XV-60011 fails or is 
inadvertently commanded 
closed  
Eventual high level in RV-301 
(See Node 10) 
 
Reverse flow from ST-301 to 
check valve of pump discharge 
 
 
Recirculation of liquid through 
pumps; operability issue 
 
 
High level in IC-301 (See Node 
3) 
  
Flow 
More/High 
None identified    
Flow 
Reverse 
None identified    
Flow 
Other 
Than 
None identified    
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NODE REF: 2       (continued) DOCUMENT REF: AL-A-P-0512/0517 
ITEM: Low Temperature Recirculated Liquid to ST-301 
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION 
Press 
No/Low 
PCV-60031 or PCV-60071 
inadvertently fails  
Low pressure to Suction 
Accumulator resulting in low 
flow (See No/Low Flow this 
Node) 
  
Press 
More/High 
Angle valve on pump discharge 
is inadvertently closed  
Deadhead pump resulting in 
high pressure and eventual 
damage to pump 
Freq:  [2] 
Ctgy:   [1]  [2]  [3] 
Svrty:  [3] 
Risk:  [3] 
Hand expansion valves to RV-
301 open  
 
PCV-60031 and PCV-60071 
 
Temp 
No/Low 
None identified    
Temp 
More/High 
None identified    
Controls 
Issue 
Inadvertent loss of oil seal on 
Recirculating Pump 
Failure of pump seal results in 
release of ammonia in machine 
room (loss of containment) 
LAL on Seal Oil 
 
Low Level Shutdown on Pump 
PU-701A/B 
 
PAL on pumps 
 
NOTE: Discharge pressure on Recirculating pumps is approximately 40 psig 
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NODE REF: 3 DOCUMENT REF: AL-A-P-0517/0514  
DOCUMENT TITLE: -45 Suction Accumulator - ST-301 
ITEM: High Pressure Liquid to IC-302 
This node involves the high pressure liquid from ST-301 to the Transfer Station, PD-301 to the 15 Controlled Pressure Receiver, IC-302.  
The MAWP of PD-301 is 250 psig @ 300 F.  PD-301, its associated instrumentation, equalization line 1"-EQ-4002-XR, and overpressure 
protection is included in this node.  Overpressure protection for PD-301 is provided by dual 1/2 x 1 PSVs (90951 and 90961).   Vessel PD-
301 and lines HPL-5012, HPL-5013, EQ-4002, RV-9095 and RV-9096 are included. 
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION 
Controls 
Issue 
Continuous thermal cycling of 
line EQ-4002 and PD-301 
Eventual exterior corrosion of 
piping and top of PD-301 
resulting in degraded integrity 
of line and subsequent loss of 
containment  
Freq:  [2] 
Ctgy:   [1]  [2]  [3] 
Svrty:  [2]  [2]  [2] 
Risk:  [2] [2] [2] 
None Consider conducting 
mechanical inspection 
of line EQ-4002 and 
PD-301 to ensure that 
integrity of piping and 
vessel is adequate for 
design temperatures 
and pressures 
ACTION NO: 6   ASSIGNED TO: Company 1/Contractor 
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NODE REF: 3       (continued) DOCUMENT REF: AL-A-P-0517/0514 
ITEM: High Pressure Liquid to IC-302 
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION 
Level 
No/Low 
PV-40041 sticks open or timer 
fails to close PV-40041 
Eventual loss of level in PD-
301 resulting in subsequent hot 
suction discharge gas blow 
through to IC-302 and pressure 
increase in IC-302 with 
potential for hydraulic shock in 
line HPL-5013 and failure valve 
(potential for loss of 
containment) 
Freq:  [3] 
Ctgy:   [1]  [2]  [3] 
Svrty:  [2]  [2]  [2] 
Risk:  [3] [3] [3] 
Local Level Indication on PD-
301 
 
LAH-3014 
 
LAHH-3013 
Consider preparation of 
an emergency mitigation 
procedure for restoration 
of PD-301 to safe 
operating condition 
without creating a 
potential for thermal 
shock when closing off 
hot gas to PD-301 
ACTION NO: 7   ASSIGNED TO: Company 1 
Level 
More/High 
PV-40041 fails to cycle to hot 
gas mode 
Eventual flooding of PD-301 
and subsequently build level in 
ST-301 (See High Level in 
Node 13) 
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APPENDIX C   
CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT 
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Group of 
Equipment Main Category 
Name of 
Equipment Type of Equipment Code 
Storage 
Equipment Pressure storage 
Pressure 
Vessel 
  EQ1 
Forced Air Evaporator Coils EQ2 
Shell & Tube Evaporators EQ3 Evaporators 
Plate Heat Exchanger 
Evaporator EQ4 
Air cooled Condensers & 
Desuperheaters EQ5 
Evaporative Condensers EQ6 
Shell & Tube Condensers and 
Double Pipe Condensers EQ7 
Process 
Equipment 
Heat transfer 
equipment 
Condensers 
Plate Heat Exchanger 
Condensers EQ8 
Supply: inlet/outlet 
piping   
  EQ9 Piping 
Intra piping   
  EQ10 
Pumps Refrigerant Pumps 
Mechanical pumps used in 
the closed-circuit ammonia 
refrigeration system EQ11 
Rotary vane 
booster 
compressor 
  EQ12 
Booster EQ13 Reciprocating 
High stage compressor EQ14 
Booster EQ15 Rotary screw 
High stage compressor EQ16 
Booster EQ17 
Compressors 
Centrifugal 
High stage compressor EQ18 
Transfer 
Transfer interface 
Loading and 
unloading 
equipment Charging Hoses EQ19 
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Group of 
Equipment Main Category 
Name of 
Equipment Type of Equipment Code 
Solenoid valves EQ20 
hand-operated stop valves EQ21 
thermostatic expansion valves;  EQ22 
automatic expansion valves;  EQ23 
highside float valves; EQ24 
lowside float valves; EQ25 
oil drain float valves EQ26 
automatic liquid refrigerant 
drain valves;  EQ27 
evaporator pressure regulators;  EQ28 
hot gas bypass regulators;  EQ29 
check valves;  EQ30 
motorized valves; EQ31 
flow regulators; EQ32 
refrigerant-containing pats of 
pilot operated  EQ33 
Valves Refrigerant Valves 
and refrigerant pressure 
actuated condensing water 
regulators. EQ34 
Control Controls Electric & Pneumatic Sensing devices EQ35 
Pressure relief Pressure Relief Devices 
Pressure relief devices installed 
in pressure vessels. EQ36 
Indicators Visual Indicators 
Bull's eyes, tubular glass and 
flat "armored gas" linear sight 
glasses/sight columns EQ37 
Purge Purge System 
  EQ38 
Other 
Filters Oil Filters 
  EQ39 
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Activity Type Ammonia Refrigeration System Code 
Chemical none ChO 
Electrochemical none EIO 
Physical 
Evaporation, compression, 
condensation, expansion and 
filtration of ammonia 
PhO 
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CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 
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S/No Category 
1 Very toxic 
2 Toxic 
3 Oxidizing 
4 Explosive 
5 Flammable liquid 
6 Highly flammable liquids 
7 Extremely flammable gases and liquids 
8 Dangerous for the environment 
9 Any classification: reacts violently with water 
10 Any classification: contact with water liberates 
toxic gas 
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No. Loss Event Description Code 
1 Fire 
Combustion of flammable substance 
with thermal radiation effects LE1 
2 Explosion 
Rapid combustion of flammable 
vapor with generation of heat 
radiation as well as overpressure 
effects LE2 
3 
Physical 
Explosion 
Release of physical energy with 
generation of overpressure as result 
of rupture of system under pressure LE3 
4 
Pipe leak 
rupture 
Release of substance as a result of 
loss of containment of the pipe LE4 
5 
Tank leak 
rupture 
Release of substance as a result of 
loss of containment of the tank LE5 
6 Vessel collapse 
Structural damage of the vessel due 
to internal or external forces LE6 
7 
Release 
substance to 
water 
Loss of containment and direct 
release of substance to water bodies LE7 
8 
Release 
substance to 
ground 
Loss of containment and direct 
release of substance to ground LE8 
9 Other Any other event leading to losses LE9 
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APPENDIX H   
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LAYER OF PROTECTION 
Safety system Acronym 
Process design GEP, INH, SAF 
BPCS (Detector-logic solver-active 
element) in DCS, mBPCS manual 
TAL, LAHL, TSH, PSH, 
LOC, RPM 
Operator supervision and 
intervention alarm 
OP 
Back up system BuS 
Cathodic protection system CPS 
Explosion proof equipment EX 
Prevention Layer 
Inertizing and solution IN-DIL 
Automatic SIS-TRIPS and isolation 
system 
SD, ESD 
Critical alarms CA 
Physical Protection  
Double containment DC 
Relieve valve/ venting RV/VEN 
Dumping DU 
Pressure safety element PSE 
Grounding – bounding GG – BG 
Emergency cooling EC 
Dikes DI 
Material disposal system – flares, 
scrubber/adsorber, incinerator, 
sewage 
MDS 
Passive system (fire walls/explosion 
walls) 
FW/EXW 
Fireproofing and blast resistance 
material and structures 
FPRS 
Fire and gas detector system F&GD 
Flame arrestors FA 
Detonation filter DF 
Protection layer 
Inhibitor trip system ITS 
Plant emergency response (active 
system: 
 
Fire suppression system FSS 
Fire fighting system FFS 
Personal protective equipment PPE 
Mitigation layer 
Community response, fire brigade FB 
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SCENARIO CLASSIFICATION 
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SCENARIO 1 IDENTIFICATION 
 
Group of 
equipment 
Main 
Category 
Name of 
Equipment 
Type of 
Equipment 
Code 
Equipment 
Classification 
Transfer Transfer 
Interface 
Loading 
and 
unloading 
equipment 
Charging 
Hoses 
EQ19 
 
Type of 
equipment 
Activity/Process Code 
Activity 
Classification Process 
Equipment 
Physical 
Operation 
PhO 
 
Substance Hazards Code 
Substance 
Class 
Ammonia 
Anhydrous 
Toxic, 
Explosive, 
Flammable 
S1 
 
Type of Loss 
Event 
Code 
Loss Event 
Selection Release 
substance to 
ground 
LE8 
 
Category Description Code Initiating 
Event 
Classification 
Human error Accidental Faulty 
Disconnection or 
connection 
HR7 
 
Category Code 
IPLS 
Operator 
supervision and 
intervention on 
alarm 
OP 
 
 
Final code scenario 1:  EQ19-PhO-S1-LE8-HR7-OP 
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SCENARIO 2 IDENTIFICATION 
 
Group of 
equipment 
Main 
Category 
Name of 
Equipment 
Type of 
Equipment 
Code 
Equipment 
Classification Transfer Pumps Refrigerant 
Pump 
Mechanical 
pump 
EQ11 
 
Type of 
equipment 
Activity/Process Code 
Activity 
Classification Process 
Equipment 
Physical 
Operation 
PhO 
 
Substance Hazards Code 
Substance 
Class 
Ammonia 
Anhydrous 
Toxic, 
Explosive, 
Flammable 
S1 
 
Type of Loss 
Event 
Code 
Loss Event 
Selection Tank leak 
rupture 
LE5 
 
Category Description Code Initiating 
Event 
Classification 
Human Failure Improper use of tools, 
equipment and 
facilities 
HR3 
 
Category Code IPLS PSV RV 
 
 
Final code scenario 2:  EQ11-PhO-S1-LE5-HR3-RV 
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SCENARIO 3 IDENTIFICATION 
 
Group of 
equipment 
Main 
Category 
Name of 
Equipment 
Type of 
Equipment 
Code 
Equipment 
Classification Transfer Pumps Refrigerant 
Pump 
Mechanical 
pump 
EQ11 
 
Type of 
equipment 
Activity/Process Code 
Activity 
Classification Process 
Equipment 
Physical 
Operation 
PhO 
 
Substance Hazards Code 
Substance 
Class 
Ammonia 
Anhydrous 
Toxic, 
Explosive, 
Flammable 
S1 
 
Type of Loss 
Event 
Code 
Loss Event 
Selection Tank leak 
rupture 
LE5 
 
Category Description Code Initiating 
Event 
Classification 
Technical 
Failure 
Failure of sealing TF12 
 
Category Code 
Operator 
supervision and 
intervention on 
alarm 
OP 
IPLS 
BPCS, low 
level shutdown 
LLS 
 
 
Final code scenario 3:  EQ11-PhO-S1-LE5-TF12-OP-LLS 
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SCENARIO 4 IDENTIFICATION 
 
Group of 
equipment 
Main 
Category 
Name of 
Equipment 
Type of 
Equipment 
Code 
Equipment 
Classification Storage Pressure 
storage 
Transfer 
Station 
Pressure 
vessel 
EQ1 
 
Type of 
equipment 
Activity/Process Code 
Activity 
Classification Process 
Equipment 
Physical 
Operation 
PhO 
 
Substance Hazards Code 
Substance 
Class 
Ammonia 
Anhydrous 
Toxic, 
Explosive, 
Flammable 
S1 
 
Type of Loss 
Event 
Code 
Loss Event 
Selection Tank leak 
rupture 
LE5 
 
Category Description Code Initiating 
Event 
Classification 
Technical 
Failure 
Failure of BPCS 
element 
TF2 
 
Category Code 
Operator 
supervision and 
intervention on 
alarm 
OP 
IPLS 
BPCS, pressure 
alarm 
LPA  
 
 
Final code scenario 4:  EQ1-PhO-S1-LE5-TF2-OP-LPA 
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